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I. INTRODUCTION
Yemen was supposed to be a success story for a transition to
federalism, a process that should have brought Yemen out of conflict
and into a new age. Yet, the transition to federalism actually
heightened the conflict in Yemen and brought about new issues. This
is because those pushing for a federalist Yemen did not understand
the complexities of federalism and the potential issues a transition to
federalism could bring about if implemented improperly. Particularly
at issue was the creation but failure to implement a new constitution.
Therefore, it is critical that states looking to transition to federalism
understand how federalism should be implemented through a
constitution, and the consequences of failing to implement it
correctly. Yemen is a proper case study for this understanding.
This article will discuss briefly both the recent history of Yemen
and its drafting of a federal constitution, as well as various lessons
learned from the failed constitution. Part II will discuss Yemen’s
history relevant to the creation of its new constitution, namely the
National Dialogue Conference and the Constitution Drafting
Committee, as well as essential elements of a federal constitution.
Part III will discuss the lessons learned about drafting a federal
constitution from this transition to federalism: the important elements
of federalism that must be incorporated into a constitution, the lack
of a formal blueprint for a federal constitution, and how Yemen fits
into these two lessons. Finally, Part IV will conclude with how states
should benefit from these lessons learned.

II. BACKGROUND
Yemen has a complex history. The state has divided, reunified,
and challenged with multiple conflicts throughout its history. This
section will discuss the history of Yemen as it pertains to its
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transition to federalism and the creation of its constitution. First, this
section will discuss Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference and its
outcome. Second, this section will provide information on Yemen’s
Constitution Drafting Committee, and the draft constitution that it
produced. Finally, this background section will conclude with the
essential elements of a federal constitution.

A. THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE CONFERENCE
The current civil war in Yemen is the latest in a long history of
violent struggle stretching back decades, if not centuries.1 Yemen,
the Arab world’s poorest country, became a unified state in 1990 as
the previously separate northern and southern states were facing
economic collapse.2 In 2011, popular protests emerged as part of the
“Arab Spring” and called for political change in Yemen.3 However,
the protests were soon overshadowed by intra-elite violence, leading
to a security vacuum across much of Yemen.4 In 2013, the United
Nations sponsored an inclusive National Dialogue Conference
(NDC) to create a new constitution which would be accepted by the
various factions within Yemen.5 The NDC was additionally
implemented to provide a forum for political negotiations,
institutional reforms, and policy issues.6 However, the general focus
of the NDC was on transitioning Yemen into a federalist system and
creating a new constitution.7 The NDC Outcome Document was the
first official endorsement of instituting a federal structure in Yemen,

1. See Peter Salisbury, Federalism, Conflict and Fragmentation in Yemen,
SAFERWORLD, 1, 8-9 (Oct. 2015), http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/viewresource/1007-federalism-conflict-and-fragmentation-in-yemen.
2. See id. at 8.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id.
5. See generally Zachary Laub, Yemen in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488.
6. Erica Gaston, Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue,
U.S. INST. OF PEACE 3, (Feb. 2014), https://www.usip.org/sites/
default/files/SR342_Process-Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-National-Dialogue.pdf;
see Laub, supra note 5 (referring to the warring political factions).
7. See Ashraf Al-Falahi, Yemen’s Fraught Constitution Drafting Committee,
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT’L
PEACE
(May
2,
2014),
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=55496.
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which was later codified in Yemen’s draft constitution.8
The NDC included 564 delegates, made up of 50% southern
Yemenis and an overall inclusion of 20% youths, and 30% women.9
The NDC focused on central controversies, such as the southern
issue, the Sa’ada conflict, transitional justice, state building, good
governance, military and security issues, institutional independence,
rights and freedoms of citizens, and development, and considered
these issues when drafting the Constitution.10
The international community reacted positively to the outcome of
the NDC and viewed it as a positive model of negotiation.11 Some
called it an “inspiring and hopeful example” of a successful step in a
peace process.12 The NDC concluded with the creation of the NDC
Outcome Document on January 21, 2014.13 The NDC Outcome
Document outlined recommendations for reforming Yemen’s
political system, resolving central issues, and transitioning to a
federalist system.14 Further, the NDC implemented the creation of the
Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), which was set to create
8. See Monthly Forecast, SECURITY COUNCIL REP., 21 (Mar. 2014),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-03/yemen_14.php.;
see generally THE CONSTITUTION Jan. 15, 2015 (Yemen), http://d6.
constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/yemen-draft_constitution-15jan2015_english.pdf (creating a federalist system of governance).
9. Charles Schmitz, Yemen’s National Dialogue, MIDDLE EAST INST., 6 (Feb.
2014), http://www.mei.edu/content/yemens-national-dialogue (explaining that this
diversity was in part a push for “present[ing] a progressive face of change”).
10. See id.; see also Southern Issue, NAT’L DIALOGUE CONF. (last visited May
21, 2017), http://www.ndc.ye/issue.aspx?show=1 (noting that the NDC focused on
the nature of north-south relations, the distribution of state structures in north and
south Yemen, the cause of grievances, and economic, cultural, educational, health,
social, and political development).
11. See Policy Analysis Unit, Outcome of Yemen’s National Dialogue
Conference: A Step Toward Conflict Resolution and State Building?, ARAB
CENTER FOR RES. AND POL’Y STUD., 6 (Feb. 27, 2014), http://english.
dohainstitute.org/release/c5b3a33b-644d-47f8-9e03-85fcb852c899 (positing that,
regardless of some internal tensions and contentious decisions, the NDC was a
beneficial process for most involved, and showed a willingness for progress).
12. Danya Greenfield, Analysis: Yemen Faces Fresh Challenges as National
Dialogue Ends, BBC (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-25928579.
13. Monthly Forecast, supra note 8, at 21.
14. See id. (explaining that the Document was to be used as a basis for the new
Draft Constitution).
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Yemen’s new constitution based on the NDC’s recommendations.15

B. THE CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMITTEE
President Hadi formed the CDC on March 8, 2014 and gave the
CDC one year to create a constitution based on the NDC’s
recommendations, to be confirmed by the National Body and ratified
through a public referendum.16 The CDC was made up of 17 panelmembers including diplomats, lawyers, judges, and other
professionals reflecting Yemen’s geographic, ethnic, and political
diversity.17 Even so, there were various objections regarding lack of
representation and expertise in federalism.18
The CDC focused on constitutional requirements to form a
federalist system, specifically including articles outlining a federal
state and the relationship between the regional areas; articles
formulating judiciary, public revenue, and natural resource
acquisition; and articles transferring financial power from
presidential control to the federal legislative branch.19 The CDC
created a new constitution based on the NDC’s recommendations,
and the draft constitution was finalized on January 15, 2015.20
15. See Al-Falahi, supra note 7; see also Jason Gluck, Constitution-Building in
a Political Vacuum: Libya and Yemen in 2014, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES 43, 50 (Melanie Allen, et al., eds., Int’l Inst.
For Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2015), http://www.constitutionnet.org/
sites/default/files/annual-review-of-constitution-building-processes-2014-pdf.pdf;
Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Yemen, Yemen
Constitutional Support, in 3 UN CONSTITUTIONAL 12, 12-13 (2014),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TheUNConstitutional_Issu
e3.pdf.
16. Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Yemen, supra
note 15, at 13 (mentioning further that the CDC was tasked with ensuring the Draft
Constitution was created from the NDC Outcome Document and consistent with
the Document).
17. Gluck, supra note 15, at 50; YemenSource, Constitution Drafting
Committee Established, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/yemensource-constitution-draftingcommittee-established.
18. See Al-Falahi, supra note 7 (stating that some political groups protested the
lack of their specific representation in the process and that those included in the
CDC did not have enough experience in federalism).
19. See id.
20. See THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8.
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Unfortunately, while the Chief of Staff, Ahmed Awad bin
Mubarak, was on his way to deliver the constitution to the National
Body in Sana’a Houthi rebels kidnapped him.21 The Houthis did not
agree with the new constitution and believed it was a “violation of
the NDC outcomes.”22 As a result, the new constitution was not
formally adopted. This has contributed to the ongoing conflict
today.23

C. ELEMENTS OF A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
At the outset, it is worth noting the difficulty of discussing
federalism and its application in a specific context. Although
federalism experts have had years of experience and capacity
building on the implementation of federalism, there is no formal
blueprint or handbook detailing how to implement it, or even where
to begin.24 A state cannot apply another state’s model of federalism,
due to the different circumstances and conditions of each state.25
Further, there is no firm set of criteria to judge the success or failure
of a federation.26 However, Ronald Watts, a leading scholar of
federalism, provides a basic definition that is useful. For Watts,
federalism “refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government
combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule . . . [T]he
essence of federalism as a normative principle is the perpetuation of
21. See Scott Neuman, Gunmen Kidnap Top Official In Yemen, NPR (Jan. 17,
2015, 9:08 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/01/17/377936813/
gunmen-kidnap-top-official-in-yemen.
22. Shuaib Almosawa, Houthi Rebels Abduct Aide to Yemen’s President, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/world/middleeast/
houthi-rebels-abduct-yemeni-presidential-aide.html; Bassam Al-Khameri, Hadi’s
Office Silent on Bin Mubarak Kidnapping, YEMEN TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1852/news/4815/Hadi’s-office-silent-on-BinMubarak-kidnapping.htm/.
23. See generally Laub, supra note 5 (discussing the fall of the Hadi
government in 2014).
24. See generally Salisbury, supra note 1, at 4 (referencing how federalism in
each state is unique).
25. See Raoul Blindenbacher & Cheryl Saunders, A Global Dialogue on
Federalism: Conceptual Framework, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE,
AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 3, 4 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr eds.
2005).
26. See MICHAEL BURGESS, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 269 (2006).
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both union and non-centralization at the same time.”27 Critically,
federations emphasize the use of a constitution as the highest
authority for the central and sub-state units.28
Some scholars suggest the drafting of a constitution is just as
important as the content within the constitution.29 Therefore, the
following subsections will outline a brief framework for
understanding the essential elements of federal constitutions. The
framework is broad and should not be considered exhaustive of all
the elements of federalism. Rather, the subsections below outline
key variables for a federal constitution, with particular focus on the
NDC Outcome Document and the draft constitution.
1. Constitutional Framework
The “constitutional architecture” influences the success of a
federal state.30 A federal constitution is critical to the functioning of a
state because it outlines the legal division of powers as agreed to by
the sub-state units of a federal system, as well as the legal and social
relationship between the people and their government.31 The legal
divisions within a particular federal state are likely to differ from
other federal states given the range of topics a constitution covers
and the various alternatives that exist.32 Indeed, the form a federal
constitution takes is a reflection of the unique history, and political
and religious culture of the populace seeking to transition to a federal

27. RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 6 (2nd ed. 1999).
28. See WATTS, supra note 27, at 99 (establishing a constitution as essential for
a successful federation).
29. See John Kincaid, Comparative Observations, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 409, 444 (John
Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr ed. 2005) (highlighting the importance of the
constitutional drafting process).
30. Michael Burgess & G. Alan Tarr, Introduction: Sub-National
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Development, in CONSTITUTIONAL
DYNAMICS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS SUB-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 3-4 (Michael
Burgess and G. Alan Tarr ed., 2012).
31. THOMAS O. HUEGLIN & ALAN FENNA, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: A
SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY 43 (2nd ed. 2006).
32. G. Alan Tarr, Introduction: Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change,
in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES
8, 8-9 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005).
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state.33
States have a wide range of discretion when drafting a federal
constitution due to the variety of federal structures that exist and the
specific state’s history and culture.34 However, a state’s constitution
for a transition to a federal government should include, at minimum,
a guide to institutional design.35 This includes a guide to the division
of regions; allocation of power; how financial, political, and
administrative institutions will be implemented; protection of
individual rights; economic considerations; and guidance on the
implementation of the new federal structure.36 Critically important is
the Constitution’s role in establishing mechanisms for
intergovernmental and inter-institutional obligations, particularly to
prevent instances of conflict.37 Moreover, the constitution should be
supported by sufficient political will and capacity.38 Further, the
drafters of a constitution should ensure the constitution is not
excessive in nature as the inclusion of too many ideas could prevent
it from being successfully implemented.39
a. Institutional Design
A critical component of transitioning to a federal system is
institutional design.40 To successfully implement a federalist
structure, a state will need to create a blueprint - a constitution tailored to its needs and challenges.41 The state must address the
elements of institutional design critical to resolving problems within
the constitution.42 Unfortunately, there is no general blueprint for a
33. Id. at 9.
34. See id. at 8-9 (discussing that federal systems differ in terms of the
structure of the government, the allocation of powers, whether they are two-party
or multi-party systems, made up of independent or centralized states, etc.).
35. See Kincaid, supra note 29, at 412 (finding institutional designs necessary
because they frame federal constitutions).
36. See Tarr, supra note 32, at 8; Kincaid, supra note 29, at 419.
37. See Kincaid, supra note 29, at 419.
38. See id. at 445 (stating trust and good-faith deliberations are essential
elements for success).
39. See infra Section III(A)(3).
40. See Kincaid, supra note 29, at 412.
41. See id. at 413 (finding constitutions are patchworks of compromises made
during drafting).
42. Id. at 412-13.
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federal constitution.43 However, if the constitution is missing critical
elements or is not specific enough, the chance of having a failed
federal state is greater.44
Federations require several institutional elements. One of the most
important elements of a state’s constitutional blueprint is the division
of regions.45 While designing this section of a constitution, drafters
should keep a number of considerations in mind. The division of
regions is often a contentious element; therefore, drafters should
ensure there is complete consensus on the number and borders of the
regions, and ensure equality among the regions.46 This equality
should take into consideration access to resources and major urban
areas.47
A second element of institutional design is the State’s institutional
framework, specifically financial, administrative, and political
institutions. The State and its newly divided regions require
infrastructure in the form of institutions to successfully function.48
Further, these institutions require guidance on their relationship to
the government and society, as well as the division of power among
the institutions.49
A third element of institutional design is political and economic
foundations. When transitioning to a federal government, a key
element within a successful constitution is the political foundation
because it is a source of energy and resources for the restructuring of
the state.50 Furthermore, such a foundation can ensure inclusive
participation in national policy, which lends legitimacy to the federal
43. Blindenbacher & Saunders, supra note 25, at 4.
44. See id.
45. See Tarr, supra note 32, at 8-9 (citing the importance of how a state
allocates power).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Yara Bayoumy, Exclusive: Civil War Costs Yemen $14 billion in
Damage and Economic Losses, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-yemen-security-damages-idUSKCN10R2B7; see generally Gaston,
supra note 6, at 4.
49. See Bayoumy, supra note 48.
50. See Astri Suhrke, Restructuring the State: Federalist Dynamics in Nepal,
CHR. MICHELSEN INST., 7 (2014), http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5171restructuring-the-state.pdf (describing the political energy necessary to restructure
a state and support the overall political process).
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system.51 Having a strong economic foundation is another key
element for a successful constitution.52 In most federal states, one of
the government’s main functions is to regulate and ensure the
stability of the economy.53 A strong economy requires a welldesigned economic system, and therefore efficient institutions to
support the system.54 When this section is lacking in detail, the
constitution is likely to fail.55
Finally, the last relevant element of institutional design is the
coordination of regional and central authorities and the division of
power. Since constitutional distribution of powers between two or
more levels of government is an essential characteristic of
federations, the supremacy of the constitution as a source of
governmental authority is imperative.56 Often, constitutions will
provide an explicit list of concurrent powers for the central and
regional governments.57 Further, a constitution must provide
mechanisms for the facilitation of central and regional government

51. See id. at 7; see also Balveer Arora, Foundations and Development of
Indian Federalism: Lessons Learnt and Unlearnt, CTR. FOR SOUTH ASIAN STUD.
AT
UNIVERSITY
OF
EDINBURGH,
6
(Feb.
2015),
http://www.csas.ed.ac.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0010/172576/Arora_Foundations_a
nd_Development_of_Indian_Federalism_Yojana2015.pdf.
52. See generally Arora, supra note 51, at 6 (discussing why historical
institutions made the creation of a common market easier than political integration
in India).
53. See Kim R. Holmes and Matthew Spalding, Why Does Economic Freedom
Matter?, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2011/04/why-does-economic-freedom-matter; see also Karen A.
Campbell, The Economic Role of Government: Focus on Stability, Not Spending,
THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2009/09/the-economic-role-of-government-focus-on-stability-notspending.
54. Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: MarketPreserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. OF L., ECON. & ORG. 1, 1
(1995), http://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/oslo/weingast_mpf.pdf.
55. Id.
56. See generally WATTS, supra note 27, at 99 (discussing constitutions and
state succession); see also Kincaid, supra note 29, at 422 (detailing that
constitutions determine the distribution of powers, in particular relating to trade,
commerce, tax, foreign affairs, natural resources, etc.).
57. See Kincaid, supra note 29, at 422 (listing that the constitutions of Russia,
India, and Nigeria have these explicit lists).
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cooperation and coordination across sectors.58
The importance of institutional design should not be overstated,
however. A survey of conditions for successful federal arrangements
notes that institutional design matters, but is not sufficient alone and
does not guarantee success or failure.59 It is important to recall that
whether a political structure is properly classified as federal
“depends not so much on the arrangement of the institutions within it
as it does on the manner in which those institutions are employed . . .
the essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional
structure but in the society itself.”60
b. Political Will and Capacity
Along with institutional design, a federal constitution must be
supported by political will and requires capacity to implement it.61 It
is true that divergent political outlooks and interests are typical of all
federations. Indeed, it is often because of these divergent interests
that federalism is seen as a solution.62 However, popular buy-in and
establishing the will of the sub-state units ensures legitimacy of
government policy.63 In short, popular buy-in and collective political
will to make the new federal system work are crucial elements of a
federal arrangement in post-conflict societies.64
Alongside popular buy-in, the capacity of the state can help or hurt
the implementation of the Constitution. Capacity refers to a base
level of infrastructure that allows sub-state units to exercise their
58. See Kincaid, supra note 29, at 432 (explaining that most constitutions
forget this element, and only focus on judicial dispute resolution).
59. Richard Simeon & Daniel-Patrick Conway, Federalism and the
Management of Conflict in Multinational Societies, in MULTINATIONAL
DEMOCRACIES 338, 361 (Alain-G. Gangon & James Tully eds., 2001).
60. William S. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, 67 POL. SCI. Q.
81, 84 (1952).
61. See Kincaid, supra note 29, at 444 (detailing that the attitude and behaviors
of political actors must support the constitution to facilitate success).
62. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 27, at 110 (finding that political divisions often
lead to the formation of federations).
63. See Kincaid, supra note 29, at 444 (noting that legitimacy also requires
transparency, as well as public participation through all the stages of the
constitution drafting process).
64. Salisbury, supra note 1, at 7.
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new-found powers.65 If the necessary institutions and personnel exist,
sufficient financial resources - either raised locally or transferred
from the central state - are required to maintain the institution and
carry out policy.66

III. ANALYSIS
This section will detail the lessons learned about drafting a
constitution for the transition to federalism through a case study on
Yemen. The international community’s approach, as well as the
Yemeni approach, was ad hoc in nature. As discussed above, states
should follow a few general steps when implementing federalism,
such as creating institutional design and ensuring buy-in from all
relevant stakeholders, but there is no consensus on the importance,
method, or hierarchy of these steps.67
In theory, Yemen had two blueprints for its constitution - the NDC
Outcome Document and the CDC’s Draft Constitution. However, as
explained below, both proved to be insufficient and in fact were the
main drivers of the current conflict. This section will discuss
Yemen’s specific constitutional blueprints in the form of the NDC
Outcome Document and the CDC’s Draft Constitution. It will further
discuss how both were inadequate to guide Yemen into
implementing a successful federal structure, and how they could
have been improved. States should use this example of an inadequate
constitution when crafting their own state specific constitution in the
transition to a federal government.

A. YEMEN’S NDC OUTCOME DOCUMENT WAS AN INADEQUATE
BLUEPRINT FOR THE CREATION OF A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Yemen created a blueprint for the creation of their new
constitution and to transition to a federalist state through the

65. Jan Erk, Federalism and Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Five
Patterns of Evolution, 24 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 535, 539 (2014),
http://rsa.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13597566.2014.971769.
66. Federalism and Peace Mediation, PEACE MEDIATION ESSENTIALS (Jan.
2009), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-forsecurities-studies/pdfs/PME_Federalism.pdf.
67. See supra Section A(2).
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production of the NDC Outcome Document.68 However, the
Outcome Document was inadequate in achieving the goal of
implementing federalism because it lacked the most basic outline of
how the federal state would be built and the contents of the
constitution.69
Specifically,
the
Outcome
Document’s
recommendations as to the division of regions and the
implementation of financial, administrative, and political institutions
were inadequate and led to conflict.70 Moreover, the Outcome
Document was formed with very little preparation, which resulted in
an attempt to create a draft constitution and impose it before a
referendum could be held.71
1. Division of Regions
As mentioned above, one of the most important elements of a
state’s constitutional blueprint is the division of regions.72 Yemen’s
NDC Outcome Document did not include this element in its
recommendations.73 Instead, the NDC committee responsible for this
decision, under the sponsorship of President Hadi, made the final
decision on the number of regions that Yemen would be split into.74
They determined that Yemen would be split into six federal

68. See Monthly Forecast, supra note 8.
69. See Gluck, supra note 15, at 50; see also Office of the Special Advisor to
the Secretary-General on Yemen, supra note 15, at 13; Yara Bayoumy, Yemen’s
federal plan a bold idea, but hurdles remain, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-politics-analysisidUSBREA1M05720140223.
70. See Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Yemen,
supra note 15, at 13 (discussing that the Document did not provide sufficient
guidance on the actual structures of the federal state, as was required to draft a new
constitution).
71. See Farea Al-Muslimi, Why Yemen’s Political Transition Failed,
CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CTR. (Apr. 16, 2015), http://carnegiemec.org/diwan/59803.
72. See Tarr, supra note 32, at 8.
73. See Reidar Visser, The Federalism Dimension in Yemen’s Draft
Constitution, IRAQ AND GULF ANALYSIS (Jan. 20, 2015), https://gulfanalysis.
wordpress.com/2015/01/20/the-federalism-dimension-in-yemens-draftconstitution/.
74. See generally Schmitz, supra note 9; see also Policy Analysis Unit, supra
note 11.
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regions.75 When making this decision, the committee ignored many
of the key interests expressed by other parties to the NDC.76
Although the regions had been discussed in committees throughout
the NDC process, there was no political consensus on the number of
regions or on how the boundaries should be decided.77 Thus, the
decision to split Yemen into six sections was highly unpopular
within Yemen, particularly among the Houthis and the parties in
South Yemen.78 The Houthis and southern Yemenis believed this
decision did not implement the agreed upon reforms from the NDC.79
This led to an increase in tension between the political parties locally
and nationally, resulting in a number of social and political
consequences that eventually fueled the current conflict.80 It is
therefore a requirement in any constitutional blueprint to have full
consensus on the issue of the division of regions - otherwise, it is
likely that conflict will arise by those parties who are dissatisfied
with the decision.
75. See Bayoumy, supra note 69.
76. See Salisbury, supra note 1, at 3; see also Schmitz, supra note 9, at 2
(explaining that the committee focused on the elite and their economic means
rather than the needs of local groups, which led to a scarcity of basic goods and
services).
77. See Schmitz, supra note 9; Outcome of Yemen’s National Dialogue
Conference, supra note 11; Fernando Carvajal, What Happened to Yemen?, FAIR
OBSERVER
(Mar.
4,
2016),
http://www.fairobserver.com/region/
middle_east_north_africa/what-happened-to-yemen-32320/
(contending
that
despite the fact that establishing a six-region federal state in Yemen was discussed
in committees, the plan was forged behind closed doors sponsored by President
Hadi and therefore intensified tensions among political parties).
78. See Ali Saif Hassan, Yemen, 25 ACCORD (LEGITIMACY AND PEACE
PROCESSES: FROM COERCION TO CONSENT) 50 (2014), http://www.cr.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes/yemen-national-dialogue-conferencemanaging-peaceful-change.; GINNY HILL, YEMEN ENDURES: CIVIL WAR, SAUDI
ADVENTURISM AND THE FUTURE OF ARABIA 264 (2014).
79. See Salisbury, YEMEN: STEMMING THE RISE OF A CHAOS STATE 19
(Chatham
House
ed.,
2016),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming-riseof-chaos-state-salisbury.pdf (revealing that the president came under fire by
Southerners and Houthis for pushing a plan to split the country into federal regions
of his own division).
80. See generally Rafat Al-Akhali, THE CHALLENGE OF FEDERALISM IN YEMEN
2 (Atlantic Council ed., 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/
publications/The_Challenge_of_Federalism_in_Yemen.pdf; Carvajal, supra note
77.
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Yemen is a perfect example of how a lack of consensus over this
important issue can lead to conflict. The NDC’s division of regions
left many Yemenis in regions that lacked resources, and basic
services such as hospitals, water, and electricity.81 This led to
violence between local communities over the sparse resources
available to them, particularly those situated outside of the major
urban areas.82 This lack of resources further displays a lack of
security or justice mechanisms.83 Thus, these local conflicts have
evolved into entrenched violence that fuels the larger conflict on the
national level.84
The most detrimental effect of Hadi’s decision on dividing the
regions pertains to the Houthis and Al-Hiraak, the group that
represents South Yemen. Specifically, the Houthis were not given
any access to the major political and urban centers such as Sa’ada or
Aden, access to oil fields, or to the valuable seaports.85 The
dissatisfaction with the division of the regions, coupled with the
dissatisfaction that the decision was made solely by President Hadi,
led the Houthi leadership to claim the new transitional government
was illegitimate.86 This fueled the Houthi coup and takeover of
Yemen.87 Indeed, one of the driving factors for the Houthi’s was the
push to redraw the federal regions to allow them access to the
81. See Salisbury, supra note 1, at 13.
82. See id. at 5.
83. See id.
84. See generally id.
85. See Thania Paffenholz & Nick Ross, Inclusive Political Settlements: New
Insights from Yemen’s National Dialogue, 6 PRISM 205 (2016),
https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/inclusive-political-settlements-newinsights-from-yemens-national-dialogue/.
86. See Salisbury, supra note 1, at 15 (identifying the moment when the
Houthis began to contest the way the decision was made to divide the six regions
as the agreement to see Sa’dah land-locked and cut off from resources or the
coastline).
87. See id. at 18; see also Eleonora Ardemagni, The Yemeni Conflict.
Genealogy, Game-Changers and Regional Implications, ITALIAN INST. FOR INT’L
POL. STUD., no. 294, Apr. 2016, at 1, 7, http://www.ispionline.it/
en/pubblicazione/yemeni-conflict-genealogy-game-changers-and-regionalimplications-14950; see also BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2016 - YEMEN
COUNTRY
REPORT
34
(2016),
https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/
files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Yemen.pdf; Paffenholz &
Ross, supra note 86, at 201-02.
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valuable natural resources and ports.88 Al-Hiraak, on the other hand,
saw the unilateral decision by Hadi as further encouragement for
secession, as it increased their fears of having other decisions
imposed on them.89 One of the reasons Al-Hiraak became involved,
albeit limitedly, in the NDC process was the belief that it would
bring a positive change to their situation.90 Because this major
decision was made without their full consensus, the failure to
consider the Southern opinion on the division of regions was seen as
a failure of the NDC to implement measures to improve the
situation.91
Therefore, drafters of a constitutional blueprint, when dealing with
the division of regions, can learn from Yemen and ensure that: there
is complete consensus on the number and borders of the regions; the
regions are equal, or as close to equal, in regard to access to
resources and major urban hubs; and that the interests of each party
are considered and respected. Although there is no guarantee that the
new division will not lead to conflict, following these basic
guidelines when drafting this section of the constitutional blueprint
may increase the likelihood of success.
2. Implementing Financial, Administrative, and Political Institutions
Although the NDC specified in their blueprint the number of
regions that Yemen would be split into, the NDC Outcome
Document failed to outline the infrastructure of the regions specifically financial, administrative, and political institutions, the
nature of the relationship between the government and these regions,
and the division of power and authority within these regions.92 In a
constitutional blueprint, it is essential to lay out how these
institutions will function and the levels of power within and between
them. When a constitution does not provide for stable institutions,
88. See Patryk Pawlak, Yemen: at a Political Crossroads, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT RES. SERV. 2 (Apr. 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/554178/EPRS_ATA(2015)554178_EN.pdf.
89. See Gaston, supra note 6, at 6.
90. See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, supra note 88, at 34 (revealing how Hirak’s
refusal to participate in the NDC in 2013 brought to light the extent of antinorthern feelings).
91. See id.
92. See Bayoumy, supra note 69; see generally Gaston, supra note 6, at 4.
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often the public becomes frustrated, which leads to polarization of
groups, as well as increased violence and distrust in the newly
formed government.93 The NDC merely granted each region local
autonomy and control without settled levels of government or
commitment.94 Specifically, the NDC did not provide guidance for
implementing the proposed institutions, such as institutions for state
authorities, basic services, or the economy.95
In general, when a newly implemented federal system does not
lead to political reforms that provide basic resources or strong
institutions, public support for that federal system becomes weak.96
Therefore, a constitutional blueprint that lays out how these
institutions will function and their balance of power is essential.
Without a strong constitution that guides these institutions, the new
government will fail in implementing whatever benefits that should
stem from these institutions. This then leads to criticism and lack of
trust towards the government.97 The lack of basic services provided
by the NDC’s transitional government, such as security, healthcare,
education, etc., led to public distrust of the transitional government.98
This allowed groups such as the Houthis and al Qaeda to gain more
support and therefore take more territory.99 The Houthis obtained
political support by providing security and justice to areas where the
transitional government failed to implement them.100 Some citizens
within those regions claimed that the Houthis worked with the people
where the government did not and solved issues most pressing to the
93. See Pawlak, supra note 89, at 1; see also Gaston, supra note 6, at 8-9
(explaining how the Yemeni population did not have a strong level of confidence
in its new government).
94. See id.; see also Al-Akhali, supra note 80, at 2.
95. Bayoumy, supra note 69.
96. See generally Salisbury, supra note 1, at 18-19.
97. See Gaston, supra note 6, at 8-9.
98. Salisbury, supra note 1, at ii; see Bombing Businesses: Saudi Coalition
Airstrikes on Yemen’s Civilian Economic Structures, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1 (July
10, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/10/bombing-businesses/saudicoalition-airstrikes-yemens-civilian-economic-structures#page (detailing that the
lack of basic services was due to coalition bombing of hospitals, commercial
enterprises, schools, and power plants).
99. See The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa, INT’L CRISIS GROUP, June 10, 2014,
at 5-6, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-huthis-from-saada-to-sanaa.pdf.
100. See id. at 6.
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population in those regions, such as revenge killings and security
measures.101
In Yemen, the NDC essentially promised the public and political
parties that their recommendations for the new federal system would
benefit them; however, this clearly was not the case.102 In fact, the
NDC failed to bring any actual structural improvements to the local
governments through their recommendations and left some within
Yemen in a worse situation than they were in before the NDC was
held.103 For example, many Yemenis were left with a lack of
electricity, no viable economy, no security, and no rule of law.104
Comparing what the NDC promised Yemen to the reality of what
was implemented has further fueled the Houthis and the overall
conflict as well as increased the distrust of the transitional
government.105
In addition to the NDC failing to outline how the regions within
Yemen would function, the NDC Outcome Document failed to
resolve economic considerations.106 The Document did not outline
the management of natural resources or the allocation of revenue.107
This was a major failure as it was the lack of economic and resource
equality that fueled the Houthi uprising.108
Although there is no blueprint on how to ensure that the above
institutions are implemented correctly and benefit the population,
drafters of a federal constitution should learn from Yemen and
include, in detail, ways to implement functional political,
administrative, and financial institutions. If the drafters fail to do so,
101. See id. at 6 (recounting a statement from a tribesman from Jawf explaining
that the Houthis received mass political support because they provided security and
justice in areas where the state was unable to do the same).
102. Salisbury, supra note 1, at 21 (highlighting how the Yemeni population
during the transition were given promises for the future instead of solutions for
current issues).
103. See, e.g., Gaston, supra note 6, at 8-9.
104. See id. at 8.
105. See generally Salisbury, supra note 1, at 21.
106. Al-Akhali, supra note 80, at 3.
107. See id.; see also Obstacles to a Federalist System in Yemen, STRATFOR,
(Feb. 5, 2014, 4:47 PM), https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/obstacles-federalistsystem-yemen.
108. Salisbury, supra note 1, at 18.
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or fail to establish how to make these institutions functional,
consequences could include a rise in conflict or distrust in the
government, both of which could lead to a failure of the newly
implemented federal system.
3. Excessive Recommendations
Even if the NDC Outcome Document had been an adequate
constitutional blueprint to successfully create a federal constitution,
the sheer number of recommendations would prohibit it from being
effective. The NDC Outcome Document contained 1800
recommendations, all of which the CDC were expected to include in
the draft constitution.109 The amount of recommendations may lead
one to believe that the NDC was a brainstorming session instead of a
true national dialogue. This is not how a state should craft a
constitution for the transition to federalism.
If a state is going to have a process similar to Yemen’s NDC, the
number of recommendations given should be limited in order for any
constitution to be effective and useful. Having too many
recommendations that all must be included in a draft constitution is
an impossible feat. Moreover, it may have been beneficial for Yemen
to include the CDC process within the NDC, so that the
recommendations could be narrowed and tailored to the constitution
drafting process.

B. YEMEN’S DRAFT CONSTITUTION WAS ALSO AN INADEQUATE
BLUEPRINT
The CDC’s Draft Constitution was produced from the NDC
Outcome Document and therefore followed the NDC Outcome
Document’s inadequacies as a federal blueprint. Not only did the
CDC have the difficult task of incorporating numerous
recommendations from the NDC, but the recommendations were
often contradictory, causing a greater lack of consensus.110 Because
of the numerous recommendations from the NDC, the Draft
109. Gaston, supra note 6, at 4, 10.
110. See Salisbury, supra note 1, at 19 (explaining how the ‘Consensus
Committee,’ tasked with harmonizing the proposals, was unable to ensure this
happened due to the eventual four-month overrun).
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Constitution is seventy pages.111 To compare, Lebanon’s Constitution
is twenty-three pages, Australia’s forty-four, UAE’s thirty-eight, and
Iraq’s forty-three.112 Further, this expansive document and lack of
guidance from the NDC led to additional gaps in the constitutional
blueprint on important issues central to implementing federalism,
such as the structure of political and economic institutions, division
of natural resources, and regional authorities, to name a few.
Although some sections appear to be well-developed, such as the
section on social and cultural foundations, and the section on rights
and freedoms, the overwhelming majority are vague and lack
detail.113 This is particularly a problem for sections that should
include greater detail to guide the new government, such as the
division of natural resources and the structure of regional
authorities.114
A constitution, particularly for a post-conflict state looking to
transition to a new form of government, should ensure that it is
concise, detail-oriented, and provides guidance for all sectors of the
government. Yemen’s Constitution found itself with two major faults
—it lacked enough detail in some sections and had too much
information in others.
1. The Critical Sections on the Political and Economic Foundation
did not Include Enough Detail
Yemen’s Constitution provided a vague, detail-limited blueprint
for its political foundation. For example, the Constitution gave power
to the people to choose their own political parties, but no description
111. THE CONSTITUTION Jan. 15, 2015 [Yemen], http://d6.constitutionnet.org/
sites/default/files/yemen-draft_constitution-15jan2015-_english.pdf.
112. See CONSTITUTION 1926, rev. 2004, (Leb.), https://www.constituteproject.
org/constitution/Lebanon_2004.pdf?lang=en; Australian Constitution rev. 2010,
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/
Constitution; CONSTITUTION, 1971, rev. 2004, (U.A.E.), https://www.
constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2004.pdf; Article 3,
Section +, <ust)r 3umh)r*yat al-’Ir.% ;The Constitution of the Republic of Ira%: of
2005, https://iraqmission.us/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/iraqi_constitution.pdf.
113. See generally THE CONSTITUTION Jan. 15, 2015, art. 43-101 [Yemen],
http://d6.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/yemen-draft_constitution15jan2015-_english.pdf.
114. See id. ch. III, VIII.
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of how to do so.115 Further, the section on political foundation
contained very vague language; for instance, it notes that the
“political system shall be based on separation of powers,” but did not
discuss what that separation is.116
Similarly, the section on economic foundation is vague and
confusing. For example, Article 15 provides that Yemen’s economy
is a “free social economy,” as well as details the foundation on which
it is based, but it does not explain or give details on how the
economy will work.117 Equally obscure, Article 18 explains that each
region will have a role in regional economic development, but not
what that role entails.118 To have been an effective blueprint for
political and economic foundations, Yemen’s Constitution should
have been more specific.
2. The Critical Sections on Division of Powers and Regional
Authorities Were Detailed, but Lacked Guidance on the Cooperation
of Regional and Central Governments
In contrast to the Constitution’s limited guidance on the political
and economic foundations of Yemen, the articles on the regional
authorities are extensive.119 Many sections provide the specific roles,
responsibilities, authorities, and objectives of the various levels of
government.120 Unfortunately, even with the extensive amount of
information, the Constitution fails to provide how the levels of
115. Id. art. 6.
116. Id. art. 8.
117. Id. art. 15.
118. Id. art. 18.
119. Visser, supra note 73 (noting that there are almost too many concepts
included in the Constitution for it to function).
120. See generally THE CONSTITUTION Jan. 15, 2015, art. 139-42, 180, 183, 18586,
205,
238,
244-45
[Yemen],
http://d6.constitutionnet.org/
sites/default/files/yemen-draft_constitution-15jan2015-_english.pdf (For example,
the House of Representatives shall assume the following functions: (1) Proposal
and discussion of federal Bills and initial adoption of such Bills; (2) Discussion
and adoption of the federal public budget; (3) Discussion and adoption of closing
accounts of the State; (4) Proposal of constitutional amendments; (5) Approval of
borrowing; (6) Approval of international agreements and treaties; (7) Oversight
over the performance of the federal executive authority and independent
institutions as set forth in the Constitution; (8) Any other functions pursuant to the
provisions of this Constitution or a federal law.).
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authority relate to the federal government or the division of power.121
The Constitution includes many levels of government, but with no
explanation of how these levels relate to one another. Therefore, the
Constitution is rendered almost useless.
As discussed above, most constitutions include an exclusive list of
powers for both the central and regional governments.122 However,
the CDC’s Draft Constitution discusses the division of powers in
various articles that are scattered throughout the Constitution, and
not in a cohesive manner.123 Although in theory having separate and
specific articles detailing each level of government’s explicit powers
would be beneficial, the Draft Constitution lists the powers in these
articles but fails to connect them or explain away any contradictions
between the articles.124 For instance, regarding the powers of the
central and regional governments over public services and natural
resources, there are contradictions over who has power over these
resources and the Constitution provides no guidelines for resolving
this contradiction.125 It seems that the Constitution implies that future
legislation will be needed to resolve these issues.126
It is absolutely critical for a state to have a functional and effective
constitution before embarking on the implementation of a federalist
structure. As seen in Yemen, when a state does not have a thorough
constitution, critical elements of federalism that must be addressed
fall through the cracks and inevitably lead to a failure of the state and
its institutions.

121. See AL-AKHALI, supra note 80, at 2.
122. See infra Section II.C.1.i; Visser, supra note 73 (clarifying that the residual
powers are applied by implication).
123. Visser, supra note 73 (finding that there are six main sections where the
division of powers are discussed).
124. Id.; THE CONSTITUTION Jan. 15, 2015, ch. III, V [Yemen],
http://d6.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/yemen-draft_constitution15jan2015-_english.pdf (listing articles on the enumerated powers of the central
and regional governments, on the powers of subunits, on shared areas of
governments, and on the other regions, particularly in the south).
125. THE
CONSTITUTION
Jan.
15,
2015,
ch.
VIII
[Yemen],
http://d6.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/yemen-draft_constitution15jan2015-_english.pdf; Visser, supra note 73.
126. Visser, supra note 73.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Federalism is a popular idea; it is a method that is going to
reappear again and again, so understanding how an effective
implementation should proceed is critical. The nature of conflict and
structural international policy favoring territorial integrity have
limited the options for experts and practitioners, leaving federalism
as one of the few policy options to end internal conflicts and civil
wars. War will continue and the international structural biases
remain; thus, federalism will continue to be advocated for.
The lessons learned above regarding federal constitutions should
be read and understood as a guide to prevent future conflicts, as in
Yemen, from occurring during the transition to a federal government.
The various elements of federal constitutions must be understood
before a transition is even considered, particularly to ensure that the
state has institutional design, political will, and public buy-in.
Regarding institutional design, a specific and detailed blueprint must
be drafted to guide the state through the transition. This blueprint
must be agreed upon through full consensus.
Federalism does not work for every state, regardless of its
perceived efficiency and ability to end conflicts. Choosing
federalism for Yemen helped lead to its current conflict, one that has
killed thousands of people and has left Yemen with destroyed
infrastructure. There is a new wave of support for the transition to
federalism that is occurring based on the lessons learned discussed
above. States should look to these lessons learned, and the current
status of Yemen, to aid their potential transition. Federalism is a
complex entity, and must be treated as such.
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